A Critique of External World Skepticism

Abstract

Philosophers since ancient Greece have forwarded and debated various skeptical theses. Contemporary philosophers continue this tradition of vibrant and compelling dialogue. The most common form of skepticism considered in contemporary academic philosophy is called “external world skepticism.” This skeptical argument seeks to deny claims that we know about the external world on the grounds that to know of the external world one must show that other possible explanations of our experiences must be known to be false. In my paper, I will explore some well-known arguments for external world skepticism (i.e., Descartes’ Dream Hypothesis and Putnam’s Brain in a Vat Hypothesis) and, in so doing, I will offer my own counterarguments against each argument. More broadly, I will reject the presuppositions of the skeptic’s argument, developing a principled criticism of those presuppositions recently attributed to Quine that will serve as a basis for my own argumentation against external world skeptical hypotheses.